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I. Introduction

In 2017, shareholder proposals urging corporate boards to
report on their climate-related risk made headlines when they
earned majority support from investors at ExxonMobil, Occidental
Petroleum, and PPL. 1 The key to this historic vote was the support
of Blackrock, State Street, and Vanguard, which broke with
management and cast their votes behind the proposals. 2 The 2018
proxy season saw several more climate-related proposals earn
majority support, and in 2018 and 2019 record numbers of
proposals were withdrawn after the companies agreed to respond
to shareholders’ requests. 3
The highly visible 2017 proposal illustrates a number of key
aspects of shareholder activism today. The first is the
mainstreaming of shareholder activism from its origins in the civil
rights and socially responsible investment movements to a point
where the largest institutional investors are integrating
“environmental, social, and governance” (ESG) or “non-financial”
factors into their voting and investment policies. 4 Second, the
1. See Steven Mufson, Financial Firms Lead Shareholder Rebellion Against
ExxonMobil Climate Change Policies, WASH. POST (May 31, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2017/05/31/exxonmobil-is-trying-to-fend-off-a-shareholderrebellion-over-climate-change/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (reporting support of
over sixty percent of shareholders on the Exxon vote and over sixty-five percent
at Occidental) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); ExxonMobil
Corp., Notice of 2017 Annual Meeting and Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Apr.
13, 2017).
2. See Mufson, supra note 1 (discussing the leaders of the shareholder
activism vote at ExxonMobil).
3. See Five Takeaways From the 2019 Proxy Season, ERNST & YOUNG (July
23, 2019), https://www.ey.com/en_us/board-matters/five-takeaways-from-the2019-proxy-season (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (explaining key takeaways from
the 2019 proxy season) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). See
also Andrew Logan, The Hidden Story of Climate Proposals in the 2018 Proxy
Season, CERES (May 29, 2018), https://www.ceres.org/news-center/blog/hiddenstory-climate-proposals-2018-proxy-season (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (reporting
on responses to shareholder engagement around climate-related risk, transition
planning, and reporting) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. See
Vanguard’s
Responsible
Investment
Policy,
VANGUARD,
https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/principles-policies/
(last
visited Sept. 23, 2019) (outlining how voting and investment policies integrate
ESG risk assessment) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 2019
Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines: North America, ST. STREET GLOBAL
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proposal shows how the focus of shareholder activism around ESG
matters has broadened beyond the civil rights, labor, and human
rights issues that were its major target throughout much of the
twentieth century. Climate change risk and corporate
environmental impacts are now among the top subjects of
shareholder proposals today. 5 Third, as explained below,
mainstream investors like Blackrock and Vanguard are supporting
ESG-oriented activism for economic reasons, not only or even
necessarily because of commitments to a particular ethical or
political position. 6 And finally, this proposal is one of many ESG
proposals (about 20 percent of all environmental and social
proposals in 2018) that seek greater corporate transparency about
non-financial risks and impacts, either to better inform investor
decision-making or to prompt changes in corporate practice. 7
This Article focuses on the challenge of achieving corporate
transparency for investment purposes and considers whether
shareholder activism is the best way to achieve it. Many in the

ADVISORS (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.ssga.com/our-insights/viewpoints/2019proxy-voting-and-engagement-guidelines-north-america.html (last visited Sept.
23, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Proxy Voting
(Jan.
2019),
Guidelines
for
U.S.
Securities,
BLACKROCK
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsibleinvestment-guidelines-us.pdf. Although the term “non-financial” properly refers
to all information contained in corporate public filings outside of the financial
statements, it includes, and is often used synonymously with, the term “ESG.”
See Richard Barker & Robert G. Eccles, Should FASB and IASB Be Responsible
for Setting Standards for Non-Financial Information?, GREEN PAPER (Oct. 12,
2018) (using the two terms interchangeably).
5. These proposals account for nearly half of all shareholder proposals filed
in 2019 as of the time of this writing. See Heidi Welsh et al., Proxy Preview 2019,
HARV. L.S. CORP. GOV. (Apr. 1, 2019) (discussing the “environmental, social, and
sustainability” shareholder resolutions proposed in early 2019). See also THE
CONFERENCE BOARD, PROXY VOTING ANALYTICS (2015– 2018) 32 (2018)
[hereinafter “PROXY VOTING ANALYTICS”] (reporting that these accounted for
38.7% of all proposals submitted to a shareholder vote in 2018).
6. See infra Part I (explaining evolving understandings of the materiality
of non-financial ESG information).
7. See PROXY VOTING ANALYTICS, supra note 5, at 31, chart 7, 86, chart 24
(reporting that forty-two proposals in the first half of 2018 addressed either
corporate reporting on environmental impact or sustainability reporting);
Virginia Harper Ho & Stephen Kim Park, Non-Financial Reporting in
Comparative Perspective: Optimizing Private Ordering in Public Disclosure, 41 U.
PENN. J. INT’L L. __ (forthcoming 2019) (discussing the dual goals of disclosure).
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business community appear to think so. 8 For example, in 2016,
many corporations and law firms offered comments to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on the question of
whether the agency should develop new ESG-related disclosure
rules. 9 Nearly all took the position that shareholder engagement
and other forms of shareholder activism were the best way to
improve ESG disclosure and that the SEC should leave well
enough alone. 10
The SEC appears to agree. Several SEC commissioners have
spoken openly about their opposition to new ESG disclosure
reform, 11 and no such reforms have yet been proposed by the SEC.
As a result, investors must rely on shareholder proposals like the
ones submitted to ExxonMobil and its peers in order to obtain
information that goes beyond what companies voluntarily disclose
in their corporate sustainability reports or, to a limited extent, in
8. Leading business organizations and trade associations say they prefer
private solutions over new disclosure regulation; however, many of these same
business groups are also pressing for restrictions on the tools of shareholder
activism. See Welsh et al., supra note 5 (discussing the Main Street Investors
Coalition and the National Association of Manufacturing’s efforts to limit
shareholders’ ability to file proposals). This conclusion is based on the author’s
own review of all of the unique comments submitted to the SEC in connection
with its 2016 Regulation S-K Concept Release, which are available at
www.sec.gov.
9. See William Thomas & Annise Maguire, SEC Studying Change of
Regulation S-K to Require ESG Disclosures, WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP
(Nov.
7,
2016),
https://www.willkie.com/~/media/Files/Publications/2016/11/SEC_Studying_Cha
nge_of_Regulation_SK_to_Require_ESG_Disclosures.pdf (discussing possible
SEC changes).
10. See Comment of Shearman & Sterling LLP on Regulation S-K Concept
Release to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 31, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-367.pdf (Certain areas of reform,
most notably in the . . . ESG space, are better addressed by ongoing engagement
with . . . investors, rather than through SEC mandates.”). See also infra Part
III.B.3 (explaining the sources of opposition to non-financial reporting reform).
11. See Hester M. Pierce, Remarks Before the Council of Institutional
Investors, HARV. L. S. CORP. GOV. (Mar. 6, 2019) (rejecting calls to introduce ESG
disclosure rules or to endorse ESG disclosure standards developed by private
organizations); Jay Clayton, Remarks to the SEC Investor Advisory Committee
(Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/clayton-remarksinvestor-advisory-committee-meeting-121318 (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (same)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). As this Article goes to press,
the SEC is considering limited ESG disclosure proposals, but their ultimate
success and form is unclear.
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their public filings. In contrast, many investors, governments, and
international organizations now urge the need for non-financial
reporting reforms that will help investors understand the financial
impact of corporate environmental and social performance. 12
I argue that although shareholder activism is a powerful tool
to change corporate practice, it is an inefficient substitute for
non-financial disclosure reform under the federal securities
laws—in fact, it has impeded it. Rule 14a-8 of the federal proxy
rules, which establishes the process and conditions for
shareholders to submit proposals to a shareholder vote, restricts
shareholders’ ability to push for better corporate disclosure and
also forces shareholders to frame their proposals in a way that
causes companies to discount the materiality of ESG
information. 13 In particular, the interpretation of Rule 14a-8’s
“ordinary business exception,” together with the rule’s long use in
shareholder activism around “public policy and social issues,” are
now discouraging support for new rulemaking that could improve
investor and market access to material ESG information.
This Article begins by explaining the major shift in
understandings of ESG materiality among investors that is driving
their growing demand for ESG information and their support for
many ESG-related shareholder proposals. It also explains why this
demand for ESG information is not already met by the wealth of
publicly available ESG information. Part III then examines the
text and interpretations of Rule 14a-8’s “ordinary business
exception” and explains how the history of its application to
environmental and social proposals has created barriers to
potentially more effective disclosure reforms. This Article
concludes by arguing for new interpretive guidance by the SEC
that would recognize the potential materiality of ESG information
and realign with the earliest of the SEC’s own articulations of the
ordinary business exception. These interpretations make clear
that proposals may raise issues that are appropriate for a
shareholder vote not only because of their “public policy” or “social”
implications, but also because they implicate important and
potentially material financial considerations.

12.
13.

See infra Part II (identifying some of these initiatives).
See infra Part III (explaining the history and application of Rule 14a-8).
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II. Beyond Public Policy: Non-Financial Materiality and Demand
for Disclosure Reform
Until relatively recently, investor demand for information on
companies’ environmental or workforce-related factors came
largely from ethical, “social,” or “responsible” investors, and the
level of such investment as a percentage of the total assets under
management (AUM) in the United States was relatively small. 14
Shareholder activists have therefore divided into several camps. In
the first camp are “financial” investors, primarily hedge funds, who
have tended to push for changes on corporate boards and, in the
view of some, short-term profit. 15 Another camp consists of public
pension funds, labor unions, religious orders, and individual
“gadflies,” whose activism has often aligned with particular values
and interests. 16 In the middle, mainstream institutional investors
like Vanguard and Fidelity have generally voted with management
against environmental or social shareholder proposals, so while
support for these proposals has grown over time, it remains
relatively low. 17 Similarly, most investors did not historically
14. See SIF FOUNDATION REPORT ON U.S. SUSTAINABLE, RESPONSIBLE, AND
IMPACT INVESTING TRENDS: 2018 —EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2018), US SIF,
https://www.ussif.org/trends (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (reporting that in 1995,
only USD $639 billion were invested using responsible investment strategies, as
compared to over USD $10 trillion in 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
15. On the role of hedge funds as catalysts of shareholder activism, see
generally Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013) (describing hedge funds as “activist arbitrageurs”). See
also William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 681–88 (2010) (highlighting investor
short-termism as a contributing factor to the 2008 financial crisis). In the past
five years, hedge funds have been responsible for between two and four percent
of all shareholder proposals. PROXY VOTING ANALYTICS, supra note 5, at 30, chart
6.
16. See PROXY VOTING ANALYTICS, supra note 5, at 30, chart 6 (reporting that
labor unions, pension funds, nonprofit organizations, and individuals remain
important sponsors of most shareholder proposals).
17. In general, ESG proposals, including those seeking greater corporate
transparency, fail to achieve majority support; average levels of support reached
only 25.7% in 2018, with less than seven percent receiving majority support.
PROXY VOTING ANALYTICS, supra note 5, at 16, 66, chart 21. In comparison,
governance-related proposals achieved an average 37.5% support in 2018. Id. at
18. An indication of mainstream investors’ historical lack of support for
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incorporate non-financial information into investment analysis,
and “responsible” investment strategies were largely focused on
ethical or social screening strategies that excluded certain firms or
sectors from investment portfolios. 18
Over the past decade or so, a striking shift has occurred in how
investors, governments, and many companies think about ESG
materiality, which has driven higher demand for investment-grade
ESG information among investors. The 2017 ExxonMobil proposal
itself illustrates this point:
Item 12–Report on Impacts of Climate Change Policies:
RESOLVED: Shareholders request that, beginning in
2018, ExxonMobil publish an annual assessment of the
long-term portfolio impacts of technological advances and
global climate change policies, at reasonable cost and
omitting proprietary information. The assessment can be
incorporated into existing reporting and should analyze
the impacts on ExxonMobil’s oil and gas reserves and
resources under a scenario in which reduction in demand
results from carbon restrictions and related rules or
commitments adopted by governments consistent with
the globally agreed upon 2 degree target [established by
the Paris Climate Accord]. This reporting should assess
the resilience of the company’s full portfolio of reserves
environmental and workforce-related proposals is Vanguard’s 2016 Voting
Guidelines, which state as follows:
The Board generally believes that these are “ordinary business
matters” that are primarily the responsibility of management and
should be evaluated and approved solely by the corporation’s board of
directors. Often, proposals may address concerns with which the Board
philosophically agrees, but absent a compelling economic impact on
shareholder value (e.g., proposals to require expensing of stock
options), the funds will typically abstain from voting on these
proposals.
Vanguard Voting Guidelines (2016), https://pcg.law.harvard.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/09/5-Vanguards-proxy-voting-guidelines-_Vanguard.pdf.
18. See Lloyd Kurtz, Socially Responsible Investment and Shareholder
Activism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 249,
251, 262–65 (Andrew Crane et al., eds. 2008) (describing screening and relative
weighting investment strategies and observing that responsible investment
includes not only “value-based” or ethical investors, but also “value-seeking” and
“value-enhancing” investors who see ESG strategies as enhancing economic
value).
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and resources through 2040 and beyond, and address the
financial risks associated with such a scenario. 19
Similarly, Blackrock’s public statement explaining its 2017
vote frames the reasons for seeking information on climate-related
risk in economic terms. It states: “[w]e will continue our dialogue
over time with Exxon and other companies on a range of issues of
economic relevance, including but not limited to climate-related
risks, and regardless of whether the companies have received a
shareholder proposal.” 20 Essentially, investors have identified
climate-related risk and other ESG factors as important to their
investment and voting decisions—in other words, within the
definition of materiality that has been established by the Supreme
Court under the federal securities laws. 21
Survey evidence confirms that the vast majority of
institutional investors now believe that companies should disclose
material ESG information to investors, but that critical ESG
information gaps exist. 22 In addition, investors with over $70
19. EXXONMOBIL, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
20. BlackRock
Vote
Bulletin,
BLACKROCK
(May
2017),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/press-release/blk-vote-bulletinexxon-may-2017.pdf (explaining BlackRock’s vote in favor of the ExxonMobil
climate change shareholder proposal) (emphasis added).
21. Under the standard set by the Supreme Court in TSC v. Northway, 426
U.S. 438, 449 (1976), information is material if there “is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote” or “that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information”
available to the investor in reaching a voting or investment decision.
22. See Kiran Vasantham et al., Institutional Investor Survey 2019 15–16
(2019),
https://www.morrowsodali.com/uploads/insights/attachments/ae189c
6414e1ef6b0eed5b7372ecb385.pdf (finding that eighty percent support the
integration of non-financial disclosure with existing mandatory disclosures and
that a similar percentage support more extensive ESG disclosure). See also PWC,
SUSTAINABILITY GOES MAINSTREAM: INSIGHTS INTO INVESTOR VIEWS 6–9 (2014),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/pwc-investor-resource-institute/publications/assets/pwcsustainability-goes-mainstream-investor-views.pdf (finding that approximately
eighty percent of surveyed investors, accounting for over fifty percent of U.S.
institutional assets, integrate sustainability information into investment analysis
but that an equal percentage were dissatisfied with its comparability);
&
YOUNG
(2015),
Tomorrow’s
Investment
Rules
2.0,
ERNST
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/investor_survey/
$FILE/CCaSS_Institutional_InvestorSurvey2015.pdf (discussing how investors
are looking for more nonfinancial reporting); Is Your Non-Financial Performance
Revealing the True Value of Your Business to Investors?, ERNST & YOUNG (2017),
http://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/assurance/climate-change-and-sustainability-
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trillion in assets under management have now voluntarily
committed to integrate ESG information into their investment
decisions. 23 More than $12 trillion AUM in the U.S. is now
managed by investors who engage in ESG-related shareholder
activism, invest in “sustainable, responsible, and impact”
(SRI)-invested funds, or incorporate ESG criteria into investment
analysis. 24 This figure represents a thirty-eight percent increase
since 2016 and over one-fourth of all assets under management in
the U.S. 25
Indeed, many governments, stock exchanges, and
international organizations have already acknowledged the
materiality of ESG information. For example, the International
Organization of Securities Commissions’ (IOSCO) 2019 Statement
on Disclosure of ESG Matters by Issuers states that “ESG
matters . . . may have a material short-term and long-term impact
on the business operations of the issuers [and] on risks and returns
for investors and their investment and voting decisions.” 26 The
London Stock Exchange’s ESG reporting guidance also observes
that ESG-related information “has moved from a ‘peripheral’ to a
‘core’ part of investment analysis, across all sectors.” 27 Even the
U.S.
Department
of
Labor
has
acknowledged
that
“[e]nvironmental, social, and governance issues may have a direct
relationship to the economic value of the plan’s investment,
[making them] proper components of the [pension fund] fiduciary’s
primary analysis of the economic merits of competing investment
choices.” 28 Outside the U.S., consideration of ESG factors in
services/ey-non-financial-performance-may-influence-investors (last visited
Sept. 23, 2019) (finding that forty percent of surveyed investors were dissatisfied
with the quality of non-financial disclosure) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
23. See
Annual
Report
2018,
at
6,
UNPRI
(2019),
https://www.unpri.org/annual-report-2018 (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (reporting
that current signatories represent over $90 trillion in assets under management)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
24. USSIF, supra note 14, at 1.
25. Id.
26. 2019 Statement on Disclosure of ESG Matters by Issuer, IOSCO (2019),
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD619.pdf.
27. Your Guide to ESG Reporting, LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE GROUP (2017),
https://www.lseg.com/esg (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
28. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard Under ERISA
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shareholder engagement and throughout the investment chain is
mandatory for institutional investors in Europe under the 2017
amendments to its Shareholder Rights Directive. 29 In sum,
investors are now as likely to assess a portfolio company’s
environmental or social practices because of their financial
materiality as they are to do so for ethical or public policy reasons.
However, as I have discussed in other work, the level of ESG
disclosure contained in corporate annual reports and other public
filings, on the one hand, and the quality of voluntary sustainability
reporting, on the other, are not sufficient to meet rising demand
for investment-grade information. 30 Public filings largely depend
on issuer judgments on the materiality of ESG information to
investors, which can lead to under-reporting. 31 Although over
eighty percent of public companies now produce voluntary
sustainability reports, these are not based on consistent reporting
frameworks and do not align with the materiality standards of
federal securities law. 32 They also lack the reliability and
comparability that investment analysis requires. 33

in Considering Economically Targeted Investments, 80 Fed. Reg. 65,135, 65,136
(Oct. 26, 2015), codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509.2015-0 I (2015) (emphasis added).
29. Directive (EU) 2017/828, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 17 May 2017 amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards to the Encouragement
of Long-Term Shareholder Engagement, 2015 O.J. (L 132), 1, 1–25,
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/828/oj.
30. See Virginia Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Disclosure and The Costs of
Private Ordering, 55 AM. BUS. L. J. 407, 446–52 (2018) (discussing nonfinancial
disclosure).
31. See The State of Disclosure 2016: An Analysis of the Effectiveness of
Sustainability Disclosure in SEC Filings, SASB (2016), at 5–8,
https://library.sasb.org/state-of-disclosure-annual-report-2/ (last visited Sept. 23,
2019) (analyzing disclosure limitations in over 700 filings, including 597 10-K
filers and 116 20-F filers, across 434 disclosure topics) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
32. See IRRC INSTITUTE AND SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENTS INSTITUTE (SI2),
STATE OF INTEGRATED AND SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 27–32 (2018) (analyzing
sustainability reporting trends in the United States).
33. See Harper Ho, supra note 30, at 428–30 (discussing these limits);
Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social Transparency as Global Corporate Strategy,
35 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 87, 93 (2014) (“[M]arket competition and CSR
commitments do not provide sufficient incentives to firms to voluntarily
disclose thereby leading to the systemic underreporting of useful information
regarding the social impacts of business activities.”).
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In its review of this reporting landscape, the Task Force on
Climate-Related Financial Disclosure (TCFD) of the G20’s
Financial Stability Board therefore concluded that available
sources of climate-related non-financial information leave critical
gaps, making assessments of the financial impacts of non-financial
risk difficult for investors and governments alike. 34 Similarly,
when the SEC last sought comment on investor views, eighty
percent supported revisions to how ESG issues are disclosed in the
annual reports, including the SEC’s Investor Advisory
Committee. 35 The observed deficiencies of current non-financial
reporting have prompted several investor petitions for new
rulemaking to the SEC, 36 as well as renewed efforts by
shareholders to obtain non-financial information and encourage
better voluntary reporting practices through shareholder activism.
III. Shareholder Activism and Non-Financial Reporting
In response to rising investor demand for ESG information,
leading business organizations, such as the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, have maintained that voluntary disclosure by
companies is sufficient, and that shareholder activism is the best
way to promote better corporate reporting practice if it is in fact
34. TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES, FINAL
REPORT: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL
DISCLOSURES, at iii, 1 (2017).
35. SASB, supra note 31, at 4; Comment of SEC Investor Advisory
Committee on Regulation S-K Concept Release to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n (June 15, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-0616/s70616-22.pdf. Symposium keynote speaker Lisa Fairfax serves on the board
of the IAC.
36. See Cynthia Williams & Jill Fisch, Request for rulemaking petition on
environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure (Oct. 1, 2018), No. 4-730,
https:/www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2018/petn4-730.pdf (explaining a request for
the SEC to engage in notice and comment rule-making to develop a better
framework for companies’ long-term risks and performance). See also Human
Capital Management Rulemaking petition to require issuers to disclose
iformation about their human capital management policies, practices, and
performance
(July
6,
2017),
No.
4-711,
https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2017/petn4-711.pdf (requesting “that the
Commission adopt new rules, or amend existing rules, to require issuers to
disclosure information about their human capital management policies, practices
and performance.”).
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necessary. 37 They therefore oppose new disclosure rules that could
expand reporting obligations for listed firms. Indeed, prior SEC
disclosure-related rulemaking that was intended to drive greater
corporate accountability for human rights practices has been met
with stiff opposition from the business community and the courts,
even when done at Congress’ direction. 38
This Symposium highlights the powerful contributions
shareholder activism has made to the civil rights movement.
Shareholder activism also led the battle against apartheid in
South Africa and has brought about more recent changes to
corporate governance norms and practice. However, confidence in
shareholder activism as an adequate substitute for disclosure
reform is nonetheless misplaced. First, the mechanisms of
shareholder activism are unwieldy if the goal is to advance the core
purposes of the mandatory reporting regime that has been
developed under federal securities law. Second, the history and
success of Rule 14a-8 have in fact undermined support for more
effective regulatory solutions from Congress, the SEC, or stock
exchanges. This Part explains these obstacles, drawing on the
history of Rule 14a-8 and its interpretation over time by the SEC
and the courts.
A. The Practical Limits of Shareholder Activism
At the outset, shareholder engagement is a costly, impractical,
and inefficient tool for achieving the goals of the federal disclosure
regime: to protect investors from fraud; to promote “fair, efficient,
and transparent markets;” and to reduce systemic risk to the
economy as a whole. 39 Most obviously, shareholder proposals are
37. See Corporate Sustainability Reporting: Past, Present, Future, U.S.
CHAMBER
OF
COM.
FOUND.
(Nov.
2018),
at
8,
https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/sites/default/files/Corporate%20Sustaina
bility%20Reporting%20Past%20Present%20Future.pdf
(summarizing
the
Chamber of Commerce’s opinion on self-reporting).
38. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(challenging conflict mineral disclosure rules).
39. OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SEC. REG. 3, IOSCO (2017),
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD561.pdf. See also Business
and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K: Concept Release, 81 Fed.
Reg. 23,916, 23,921 (Apr. 22, 2016) (articulating similar goals as the core of the
SEC’s mission).
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by law advisory, and the board is free to disregard even a majority
vote. 40 Shareholder proposals also target only a relative handful of
public companies each year, mostly large-capitalization companies
in the S&P 500. 41 For example, between 2015 and 2018, only forty
to sixty proposals on environmental or sustainability reporting
went to a vote each year at Russell 3000 companies. 42 Although
successful shareholder proposals at firms that are highly visible
industry leaders often have spillover effects on other firms, the ad
hoc, campaign-like nature of shareholder activism is better suited
to raising companies’ awareness of investor concerns, not to
standardizing how companies report on non-financial risks and
impacts associated with their business. Finally, a growing number
of environmental and social proposals do succeed in getting a
response from management before a vote occurs, 43 but those that
go to a vote routinely garner relatively low levels of shareholder
support and are therefore even easier for boards to ignore. 44
Most critically, the purpose of the proxy rules under Section
14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) is
to promote shareholder democracy as a check on corporate
management, and to prevent fraud. 45 High shareholder support for
40. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) (permitting exclusion of proposals that
would be improper under state law); Adoption of Amendments Relating to
Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 12,999, 41 Fed. Reg.
52,994, 52,998 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Release] (“[P]roposals that merely
recommend or request that the board take certain action [are] not contrary to the
typical state statute, since such proposals are merely advisory in nature and
would not be binding on the board even if adopted by a majority.”).
41. PROXY VOTING ANALYTICS, supra note 5, at 26.
42. Id. at 86, chart 24.
43. See id. at 15 (finding that the rate of withdrawn proposals doubled in
2018 over 2017). Withdrawal of a proposal by the proponent often indicates that
a successful response was obtained without the need for a formal vote. See Paula
Tkac, One Proxy at a Time: Pursuing Social Change Through Shareholder
Proposals, 91 ECON. REV.: FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA, Aug. 2006, at 1, 13 (2006)
(“[W]ithdrawal can be viewed as indicating some level of success.”); Rob Bauer et
al., Who Withdraws Shareholder Proposals and Does It Matter? An Analysis of
Sponsor Identity and Pay Practices, 23 CORP. GOV.: INT’L REV. 472, 474 (2015) (“[I]f
negotiations are successful, the proposal is withdrawn.”).
44. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing historical average
levels of shareholder support for environmental and social proposals).
45. See Roosevelt v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 421–22
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (reviewing the purpose of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act). See
also 1976 Release, supra note 40, at 52,995 (emphasizing the rule’s goal to
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a proposal may signal that the topic is indeed material to investors,
but that is not a prerequisite for the proposal to be in included in
the corporate proxy. As the legislative history of Rule 14a-8
discussed below makes clear, shareholder activism is intended as
a megaphone for investors, not primarily as a conduit of
information to the market. 46 Rule 14a-8 is therefore designed to
address much broader goals than those that drive the federal
disclosure regime, but it is for the same reason not well-suited to
fixing the core problems of comparability and standardization that
currently plague voluntary ESG reporting.
B. The Ordinary Business Exception and Anti-Materiality
Beyond the practical limits of Rule 14a-8, the SEC’s
interpretation of the rule itself and the very success of social
activists in the past have perhaps ironically become barriers to any
future rule-making that could help standardize how material ESG
information is disclosed. This is problematic, because corporate
transparency around material ESG factors is essential to both
market efficiency and corporations’ accountability to their
shareholders, as well as other stakeholders. In addition, as I have
argued elsewhere, disclosure reform is a more efficient solution to
the under-reporting of material ESG information. 47 The core issue
concerns one of the provisions of Rule 14a-8 known as the “ordinary
business exception,” which has a direct effect on whether many
shareholder proposals go to a vote. This Part introduces the history
of this provision and explains how its scope and implementation
have affected how companies view the materiality of ESG issues.

advance shareholder democracy).
46. See Roosevelt, 958 F.2d. at 421–22 (“Congress did not narrowly train
section 14(a) on the interest of stockholders in receiving information necessary to
the intelligent exercise of their [voting] rights under state law” but to “give true
vitality to the concept of corporate democracy.”). Indeed, Regulation FD (for “fair
disclosure”) restricts the disclosure of material non-public information that is not
simultaneously disclosed to the public. 17 C.F.R. § 243 (1939).
47. See generally Harper Ho, supra note 30.
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1. The Purpose and History of Rule 14a-8 and the Ordinary
Business Exception
Shareholders’ ability to exercise voice in corporate governance
rests largely on their ability to submit shareholder proposals to the
corporation for inclusion in the corporate proxy under Rule 14a-8. 48
Although the proxy rules were introduced in 1935, 49 the SEC did
not adopt a rule requiring shareholder proposals to be included in
the corporate proxy until 1942. 50 The legislative history of Rule
14a-8 indicates that its purpose was to facilitate shareholder
participation in corporate governance and to serve as a check on
potential managerial abuse in the proxy solicitation process. 51
Rule 14a-8 now allows corporations to exclude a proposal from
the corporate proxy if it fails to comply with the procedural rules
of Rule 14a-8 or if there is a substantive basis for exclusion under
Rule 14a-8(i). 52 If a company is uncertain about whether it can rely
on an exclusion, it can petition the SEC for “no-action” review of
the issue or seek a court’s determination of the issue. 53 The
48. See Bauer et al., supra note 43, at 474–76 (discussing how shareholder
proposals can initiate direct engagement or follow an unsuccessful engagement).
49. See generally Exchange Act Release No. 378 (Sept. 24, 1935).
50. See Exchange Act Release No. 3347 (Dec. 18, 1942) [hereinafter “1942
Release”] (adopting the rule that initially became Rule 14a-7). See also LISA
FAIRFAX, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A PRIMER ON SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND
PARTICIPATION 65 (2011) (discussing this history); Kevin W. Waite, The Ordinary
Business Operations Exception to the Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Return to
Predictability, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1253, 1254 (1995) (same).
51. See Waite, supra note 50, at 1260 n.42–44 (citing this legislative history).
Rule 14a-8 was originally adopted as Rule 14a-7.
52. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (listing reasons a company may exclude a
shareholder proposal).
53. The SEC issues interpretations and guidance relating to these
exceptions, but companies may also petition the SEC for “no-action relief” by
stating the exception on which they tend to rely and seeking an opinion from SEC
staff that it will take “no action” to enforce Rule 14a-8 against the company if it
excludes the proposal from its corporate proxy. SEC no-action letters are
non-binding. See Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 877, 884–86 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (discussing the degree of
deference courts afford to no-action letters given their non-binding nature).
Alternatively, shareholders and companies may litigate the question of whether
a proposal is excludable or not, and courts may take positions that differ from
those of the SEC staff. See, e.g., infra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing
Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,792 F.3d 323 (2015), which parted
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substantive grounds for excluding proposals from the corporate
proxy found in modern Rule 14a-8(i) did not exist in the initial
version of the shareholder proposal rule, though it did contain
some procedural conditions. 54 Prior to 1976, the rule simply
required companies to include any proposal that was “a proper
subject for action by the security holders.” 55 From 1942 to 1976,
the SEC determined what was a “proper subject” of a shareholder
proposal with reference to state corporate law. 56 However, because
state law generally provides only that “the business and affairs of
the corporation shall be managed by the board of directors” 57 and
because state courts offered little guidance on what might be a
“proper purpose” for shareholder consideration, SEC staff began to
develop their own interpretative guidance. 58
Perhaps the most important of these substantive bases for
exclusion is the “ordinary business exception,” 59 which allows the
company to exclude a shareholder proposal from the corporate
proxy if “the proposal deals with a matter relating to the company's
ordinary business operations.” 60 This provision, which was first
introduced in 1954, 61 is one of the most widely used grounds for
exclusion and is among the most heavily litigated of the Rule 14a-8
exceptions. 62
course from the SEC’s interpretation of Rule 14a-8(i)(7)).
54. See FAIRFAX, supra note 50, at 65–66 (discussing this history).
55. 1942 Release, supra note 50.
56. Waite, supra note 50, at 1261 n.51 (citations omitted).
57. See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 141(a) (2018).
58. See Apache Corp. v. NYCERS, 621 F. Supp. 2d 444, 449 n.4 (2009)
(observing the lack of state law guidance on this question).
59. In 2018, the ordinary business exception was one of the most common
grounds for exclusion that companies raised in their requests for no-action review
(thirty-three percent of all no-action requests); around sixty percent succeeded,
down from nearly seventy-five percent in 2017. See Ron Mueller et al.,
Shareholder Developments in the 2018 Proxy Season, GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER
LLP
(July
12,
2018),
at
11,
https://www.gibsondunn.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/07/shareholder-proposal-developments-during-the-2018proxy-season.pdf (discussing statistics on the usage of the ordinary business
exception in 2018).
60. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-18(i)(7).
61. See Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No.
4979 (Jan. 6, 1954) [hereinafter “1954 Release”] (discussing the introduction of
the ordinary business exception).
62. See FAIRFAX, supra note 50, at 72 (discussing in detail the ordinary
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As the SEC explained in its 1998 interpretative release (“1998
Release”), the ordinary business exception rests on two underlying
policy goals. The first is “to confine the resolution of ordinary
business problems to management and the board of directors, since
it is impracticable for shareholders to decide how to solve such
problems at an annual shareholders meeting.” 63 As a result, the
SEC considers whether the “subject matter of the proposal
[concerns] tasks [that] are so fundamental to management’s ability
to run a company . . . that they could not . . . be subject to direct
shareholder oversight.” 64 For example, proposals involving “the
management of the workforce, such as the hiring, promotion, and
termination of employees,” generally relate to ordinary business
matters and are therefore excludable. 65 Second, the proposal
cannot “micro-manage” by engaging with complex matters on
which shareholders collectively “would not be in a position to make
an informed judgment.” 66
Because most shareholder proposals and the vast majority of
those dealing with environmental or social concerns necessarily
relate to some aspect of the company’s operations, 67 the ordinary
business exception is also one of the most important substantive
bases for the exclusion of environmental and social proposals. 68
Table 1 gives an indication of how often common environmental
and social topics have been raised in shareholder proposals that
have been challenged by the company under the ordinary business
business exception).
63. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-40018 (May 21, 1998) [hereinafter
“1998 Release”]. See also SEC Staff Leg. Bulletin 14J (Oct. 23, 2018) (discussing
the rule’s origin and intent); SEC Staff Leg. Bulletin 14I (Nov. 1, 2017) (same).
64. 1998 Release, supra note 63.
65. Id. See also SEC Staff Leg. Bulletin 14J, supra note 63 (citing Staff Legal
Bulletin No. 14A (Jul. 12, 2002)).
66. 1998 Release, supra note 63 (citing 1976 Release, supra note 40, at
52,997).
67. The SEC and the courts have both observed that most proposals can be
swept into the ordinary business exception, absent the SEC’s broader interpretive
gloss. See 1976 Release, supra note 40, at 52,997 (announcing the “significant
policy” exception to address this). See also Amalgamated Clothing & Textile
Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 877, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(referencing the 1976 Release).
68. See supra note 59 (explaining in detail the usage of the ordinary business
exception).
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exception over the past 20 years. 69 Because corporations rely
heavily on the ordinary business exception when considering ESG
proposals, companies’ experiences with ESG-related activism has
largely defined their views of these issues.
2. “Transcending” the Ordinary Business of the Company is
Equated with “Policy” or “Social” Issues
Since 1976, the SEC’s interpretation of the ordinary business
exception has expanded shareholders’ ability to bring proposals to
a vote by allowing them to speak to the “ordinary business” of a
company so long as the subject of the proposal also implicates a
“significant policy issue.” As I explain in Part IV, the provenance
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of the SEC’s 1976 interpretive release (“1976 Release”) 70 clearly
indicates an intention that this exception encompass matters that
are financially significant as well. However, the more common
formulation defines “significant” in terms of “social or policy”
issues, and this history now presents a significant obstacle to
non-financial reporting reform because it appears that shareholder
proposals advance issues that are not material. As explained
above, investors advocating for non-financial reporting reform
routinely assert that certain ESG matters are financially material
to the firm and its investors, making better corporate reporting
essential. 71 However, if the same investors seek improved
disclosure via a shareholder proposal, they must raise their
petition in the very different language of politics, shareholder
democracy, and social movements.
Concerned that proposals “which have significant policy,
economic, or other implications inherent in them” were being
excluded under the ordinary business exception and undermining
shareholder democracy, the 1976 Release adopted a new
framework for determining whether a proposal should be excluded
under the “ordinary business exception.” 72 The SEC concluded that
a company may only exclude proposals “relating to the conduct of
the ordinary business of the issuer” that “are mundane in nature
and do not involve any substantial policy or other
considerations.” 73 In essence, the SEC created an exception for
proposals raising important policy issues. As the SEC elaborated
in the 1998 Release, proposals relating to the “ordinary business”
of the company may be excluded unless the proposal “focuses on
policy issues that are sufficiently significant because they
transcend ordinary business and would be appropriate for a
70. See supra note 40 (explaining 1976 Release).
71. For ESG matters that may not be material to a given firm, disclosure
reform that is intended to change corporate conduct rather than simply elicit
better information may also be within the SEC’s authority to regulate in the
public interest or to address sources of systemic risk. See Harper Ho, supra note
30, at 440, 445–46 (presenting these arguments).
72. 1976 Release, supra note 40.
73. Id. at 52,998. The 1998 Release defines the scope of ordinary business to
mean proposals “so fundamental to management’s ability to run a company on a
day-to-day basis that they could not, as a practical matter, be subject to direct
shareholder oversight.” 1998 Release, supra note 63.
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shareholder vote.” 74 In 1998, the SEC also clarified its current
two-part approach, adding that proposals raising a “sufficiently
significant” issue can only be excluded if they “see[k] to
micro-manage the company.” 75
Of course, interpreting which issues are both of relevance to
the company and yet “sufficiently significant” to transcend
“ordinary business” is a highly subjective and therefore difficult
task for the SEC and the courts. 76 The SEC has at times identified
certain issues as “significant” in its interpretive guidance. For
example, in 2009, the SEC relaxed its interpretation of Rule
14a-8(i)(7) in the wake of the financial crisis to state that “the
board’s role in the oversight of a company’s management of risk is
a significant policy matter.” 77 On rare occasions, it has attempted
to set bright-line rules for which proposals are not significant
enough. 78 Since 2017, the SEC has also required corporations
relying on this exception to discuss in their no-action request the
74. SEC Staff Leg. Bulletin 14I, supra note 63 (citing 1998 Release, supra
note 63). The 1998 Release stated disjunctively the requirement that the proposal
“transcend” ordinary business and raise a “significant policy or other issue.” Id.
This prompted the Third Circuit to adopt a bifurcated test in Trinity Wall Street
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 729 F.3d 323 (3rd Cir. 2015), in which the court stated
that for a proposal to avoid exclusion, “a shareholder must do more than focus its
proposal on a significant policy issue; the subject matter of its proposal must
‘transcend’ the company’s ordinary business.” In 2015, the SEC rejected this
interpretation and expressed concern that distinguishing the two concepts would
“lead to the unwarranted exclusion of shareholder proposals.” SEC Staff Leg.
Bulletin 14H (Oct. 22, 2015). Instead, it reaffirmed its own position that proposals
that raise a significant policy issue will therefore “transcend a company’s ordinary
business.” Id.
75. 1998 Release, supra note 63; Apache Corp. v. NYCERS, 621 F. Supp. 2d
444, 451 (2009).
76. It is important to note that shareholder proposals cannot raise issues
wholly unconnected with the company; there must be a “sufficient
nexus . . . between the nature of the proposal and the company” in order for the
significant policy exception to apply. SEC Staff Leg. Bulletin No. 14E (Oct. 27,
2009). See also SEC Staff Leg. Bulletin No. 14H at n. 32 (Oct. 23, 2015) (same).
77. SEC Staff Leg. Bulletin No. 14E (Oct. 27, 2009).
78. In general, the SEC rejects bright-line tests for the “significance” of a
given issue. However, in 1992, the SEC’s Cracker Barrel No-Action letter adopted
a bright-line test that would consider all employment-related proposals
excludable, other than those involving executives. Cracker Barrel Old Country
Store, SEC No-Action Letter (Oct. 13, 1992), aff’d by Commission, Cracker Barrel
Old Country Store, Inc. (Jan. 15, 1993). In its 1998 Release, the SEC abandoned
this bright-line test in favor of a case-by-case approach to employment matters.
1998 Release, supra note 63.
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board’s assessment of whether the matter is in fact “sufficiently
significant.” 79 Regardless, the SEC’s most common formulation of
this exception omits any mention of economic importance to the
company or its shareholders, which is a touchstone of materiality
under the federal securities laws. Instead, it requires that
shareholders seeking to prevent proposals related to corporate
operations from being excluded must frame them as raising a
“significant policy issue.”
This common short-hand entrenches the view that
environmental and social risks and other factors are not
economically material to the firm and its investors, but are instead
a smokescreen for the social or political agendas of niche investors
and related interest groups. Companies opposed to such proposals
are therefore even more likely to view them as immaterial and as
an inappropriate subject of future disclosure reform. As the
International Integrated Reporting Council has noted, “the use of
terminology such as ‘sustainability or public policy
issues . . . marginalizes such information and impedes its effective
integration into the core investor document.” 80
At the same time, the second part of the two-part test—the
prohibition on “micro-management”—also prevents shareholder
proposals from being an effective alternative to ESG disclosure
reform. First, the more prescriptive a proposal, the more likely it
is to be found to “micromanage” the company’s approach to its
workforce, environmental concerns, or how it manages its existing
public reporting obligations. However, the problems with the
current state of ESG disclosure are not a lack of information that
could be resolved by broad requests for sustainability reporting, for
example, but a lack of standardization, which requires consistency
across disclosing companies and greater particularity in the
content and form of disclosure.
A proposal will be considered micromanagement if it “involves
intricate detail, or seeks to impose specific time-frames or methods
for implementing complex policies.” 81 Although the SEC adopts a
79. SEC Staff Leg. Bulletin 14I, supra note 63.
80. Comment of International Integrated Reporting Council on Regulation
S-K Concept Release to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Aug.
31, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-197.pdf.
81. See SEC Staff Leg. Bulletin 14J (Oct. 2, 2018) (citing 1998 Release, supra
note 63, and Apple, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Dec. 5, 2016 (finding excludable
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presumption of inclusion, proposals urging the company to use
certain performance indicators or adopt particular reporting
standards may therefore raise micro-management concerns. For
example, in 2018, the SEC, in a surprising departure from past
practice, concluded that a resolution asking EOG Resources to
adopt greenhouse gas emission goals sought to micromanage the
company and could therefore be excluded. 82 In addition, the
general requirement that shareholder proposals be non-binding on
the board in deference to the board’s role under state corporate law
also means that the more prescriptive a proposal, the more likely
it is to be excluded from the corporate proxy under Rule 14a-8(i)(1).
For these reasons, shareholder proposals are a poor substitute for
the adoption of ESG disclosure rules and principles that would
apply to all companies’ public filings.
Finally, corporate issuers’ perceptions of the economic
importance of ESG issues have been diminished by the
“democracy” in shareholder democracy. This Symposium has
highlighted the tremendous role shareholder activism has played
in the civil rights movement and beyond. However, the fact that
the typical proponent of such proposals has historically been an
individual, responsible investment fund, labor union, or religious
order has reinforced corporations’ fears of expansive and politically
motivated regulation when it comes to disclosure reform.
3. Rejection of ESG Materiality and Opposition to Non-Financial
Disclosure Reform
Since the SEC has directed shareholders to frame proposals
related to corporate operations or their impact in terms of “social”
or “policy” issues for over forty years, it is perhaps not surprising
that many companies now view the potential integration of ESG
disclosure into mandatory public filings as a politicization of the
SEC’s mission and ESG issues themselves as largely “social” or
a proposal asking the company to prepare a plan to “reach net-zero greenhouse
gas emissions by 2030”)).
82. EOG Resources, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 26, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2018/trilliummiller022
618-14a8.pdf. The proposal requested that EOG “adopt company-wide,
quantitative, timebound targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and issue
a report discussing its plans and progress towards achieving these targets.” Id.
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“political,” rather than potentially “economic” or “material.” The
Business Roundtable, a staunch opponent of any new federal
reporting requirements, is opposed to ESG-related shareholder
activism itself on these grounds, arguing that “[s]hareholders
should not use their investments in U.S. public companies for
purposes that are not in keeping with the purposes of for-profit
public enterprises, including but not limited to the advancement of
personal or social agendas unrelated and/or immaterial to the
company’s business strategy.” 83
Despite the evidence that the vast majority of institutional
investors want better ESG disclosure, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce’s 2017 position paper on corporate disclosure reform
also questions the value of ESG information and even the
rationality of investors who seek to use it. It states: “[a]n investor
that bases its voting and investment decisions on promoting social
or political goals is not a ‘reasonable’ investor when it comes to
what materiality means under the federal securities laws.” 84 And
in 2016, ExxonMobil explained its own resistance to ESG
shareholder proposals in similar terms: “[t]he concept of
‘reasonable investor’ should govern the SEC’s consideration of
disclosure requirements, which necessarily should exclude
disclosures promoted by narrowly-focused special interest groups.
The SEC should avoid promoting political, social, and public policy
objectives, or attempting to drive related corporate behavior
advocated by special interest groups.” 85
Comments from business organizations, issuers, and the legal
community to the SEC on the wisdom of revising the federal
disclosure regime to require more specific ESG disclosures have
adopted a more strident tone. For example, the National Mining
Association, which led a successful legal battle against conflict
mineral disclosure rules, argues that:
83. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (2016),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/brt.org/principles-of-corporate-goverance-2016.pdf.
84. Essential Information: Modernizing Our Corporate Disclosure System,
CTR. CAP. MKT. COMPETITIVENESS, U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., (2017), at 1, 8,
https://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/U.S.ChamberEssential-Information_Materiality-Report-W_FINAL-1.pdf.
85. David S. Rosenthal, ExxonMobil Corp., Comment Letter Concept
Release on Bus. and Fin. Disclosure Required on Regulation S-K (Aug. 9. 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s-7-06-16/s70616-355.pdf.
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Activists . . . are now . . . under the guise of transparency
and good governance, seeking to have the Commission
adopt reporting requirements that exceed traditional
reporting contours. The net result is the politicization of
the Commission to achieve a social or political goal that
has been outside their grasp by traditional
means . . . advancing a special interest focus. 86
The Maryland Bar Association’s comments to the SEC on the
question of ESG disclosure reform were even more strongly
worded: “[a]s securities lawyers, this perversion of the federal
securities laws truly offends us. We urge the Commission not to
make this situation worse.” 87
As these remarks suggest, there is sustained opposition to
non-financial reporting reform because it is seen as an attempt to
achieve “social” or “political” objectives. While the implication is
that such efforts are “impermissible,” the federal proxy rules were
in fact intended to advance the public interest 88 and the anti-fraud
and investor protection goals of the federal securities laws are
premised on the power of disclosure to prevent harmful corporate
practices that would be difficult to eradicate otherwise.
Nonetheless, it is clear that opposition by companies, trade
associations, and members of the corporate and securities bars to
potential ESG disclosure reform is being fueled in part by the
spillover effects of shareholder activism, and in particular, by how
the SEC has defined the ordinary business exception.

86. Bruce Warzman, Nat. Mining Ass’n, Comment Letter on Concept
Release on Bus. and Fin. Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K (July 21, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-260.pdf.
87. Penny Somer-Greit & Gregory T. Lawrence, Comm. on Sec. Law of the
Bus. Law Section of the Md. State Bar Ass’n, Comment Letter on Concept Release
on Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K (July 21, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-257.pdf.
88. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
authorize the SEC to require disclosure when “necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.” Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77g(a)(10), 77s(a) (2012); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(b),
78l, 78m(a), 78n(a), 78o(d), 78w(a) (2012). See also Donald C. Langevoort & Robert
B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS
Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 375–82 (2013) (asserting that this “publicness” is a
defining feature of securities law); Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1012, 1017–31 (2013) (same).
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IV. Reframing the Ordinary Business Exception
Since 1976, shareholders’ ability to raise “significant” issues
about corporate activities has expanded the space for the use of
shareholder proposals and engagement with corporate
management, changing corporate norms, shining light on
troubling corporate practices, and focusing corporations on what
matters to investors. Indeed, shareholder proposals have already
raised the profile of ESG issues for companies and among more
mainstream investors. But as the materiality of ESG factors
becomes more widely recognized, it is essential that the SEC’s
implementation of the proxy rules—the mechanisms of investor
self-help—do not impede more efficient ESG disclosure reform
through direct rule-making.
This Article does not argue for the elimination of the ordinary
business exception, nor does it advocate fundamental changes to
the shareholder proxy rules. Of course, future revisions to the rules
governing the informational content of proxy statements could
improve investor access to decision-useful, non-financial
information. But this Article’s key concern is not with the text of
Rule 14a-8 itself. Instead, its focus is the framing effects and
communicative impact of the SEC’s interpretation of the ordinary
business exception.
The basic proposal here is therefore quite simple—that the
SEC carefully consider the language it uses to define “substantial”
matters so that it acknowledges the potential economic
significance or materiality of ESG issues in no-action letters,
future staff guidance, policy statements, and interpretations. By
acknowledging the economic significance of non-financial issues,
the SEC can weaken the false perception that non-financial
matters are not material to investors. Such a shift would also
prevent the incongruity of proponents defending material ESG
issues from exclusion on ordinary business grounds by asserting
their social and political, rather than economic, importance.
As it happens, implementing this modest proposal would
require only that the SEC revive its use of the language of the 1976
Release, which in fact identified matters “beyond the realm of an
issuer’s ordinary business operations” as those with “significant
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policy, economic or other implications.” 89 In the 1976 Release, the
SEC also clearly recognized that many shareholder concerns might
be “significant” for both economic and public policy reasons. 90
Indeed, the SEC made its case for allowing some “ordinary
business” proposals to reach a shareholder vote by citing an
example that raised both economic and public policy (i.e. safety)
considerations: the decision of whether to construct a nuclear
power plant. 91 In keeping with its original formulation, the SEC
should clarify that its standard allows companies to exclude
proposals only if they do not raise “significant policy or economic”
issues, instead of describing the exception as one for proposals
“that raise significant social policy issues.” 92
This is not to say that all ESG proposals raise material
economic concerns, nor does this Article anticipate that the
adoption of ESG-related disclosure reforms by the SEC would
eliminate the need for ESG shareholder proposals, even those
concerning information disclosure. Such proposals will still be
essential, helping investors to raise contested topics and helping
companies gauge investor interest in issues that may not be
material, or may not ultimately merit a corporate or agency
response. 93 Many of these topics may be areas of emerging risk for
companies, while others may never become economically material.
This is often true, for example, where investors raise concerns
about corporate impacts on remote or diffuse stakeholders, such as
victims of human rights abuses, or environmental exploitation. In
these cases, shareholder activism remains an essential vehicle for
communicating investors’ views, raising the profile of issues they
care about, and leveraging companies’ reputational interests to
spur changes in how companies do business, perhaps more
powerfully than could be achieved via regulation. Still, reframing
89. 1976 Release, supra note 40, at 52,998 (emphasis added).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 1998 Release, supra note 63 (emphasis added).
93. As of the time of this writing, the SEC is considering reforms urged by
several business organizations that could impose higher ownership thresholds
and other limitations on shareholders’ ability to file proposals, outcomes that
would undercut the many positive contributions of shareholder activism
highlighted here. See Welsh et al., supra note 8 (discussing proposals to introduce
such limits).
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how investors, companies, and the SEC’s own staff articulate and
approach the ordinary business exception could change how
corporate boards and their advisors understand ESG materiality
and the growing demands of investors for ESG transparency.
V. Conclusion
Shareholder activism has already pushed many changes in
corporate practice, ranging from corporate governance issues like
proxy access, to environmental and social concerns, such as climate
change mitigation, diversity, and sustainability reporting, all of
which have potentially significant financial implications. 94
Shareholder activism has also begun to shift corporate norms
around ESG materiality, and many proposals seek some form of
information disclosure from corporate boards. However,
shareholder activism cannot substitute for disclosure reform,
which is a more efficient way to reduce ESG information gaps and
standardize how this information reaches investors.
This Article therefore argues that the SEC should reframe
how it defines “significant” to acknowledge the potential economic
significance of non-financial matters that may be the subject of a
shareholder proposal or no-action request. As we have seen, this
interpretive stance is in fact faithful to the SEC’s early
articulations of the ordinary business exception. By acknowledging
the economic relevance of ESG issues, the SEC can reduce issuer
misperceptions that investor attention to sustainability or ESG
issues flows only from a political or social agenda. Simply by
changing its rhetoric, the SEC could reaffirm Congress’ intent to
create a broad forum for shareholder voice, and at the same time
remove a subtle, but powerful ideological barrier to future
disclosure reforms.

94. See, e.g., Kosmas Papdopoulos, The Long View: The Role of Shareholder
Proposals in Shaping U.S. Corporate Governance (2000–2018), HARV. L.S.F. ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
AND
FIN.
REG.
(Feb.
6,
2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/06/the-long-view-the-role-of-shareholderproposals-in-shaping-u-s-corporate-governance-2000-2018/ (last visited Sept. 23,
2019) (tracing the corporate governance reforms that companies have adopted in
response to shareholder proposals) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).

